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human brucellosis in 30 years were confirmed in Taiwan.1
All cases occurred in returned travelers from regions
where brucellosis is endemic. It reminds us of the possible
threat of this neglected zoonosis.
Brucellosis is the most common zoonotic disease world-
wide with more than 500,000 new cases diagnosed annu-
ally. This disease is caused by the Brucella species and
major animal hosts are goats, sheep, camels, cows, and
pigs. Transmission to humans occurs through ingestion of
infected, unpasteurized animal-milk products, through
direct contact with infected animals, or through the inha-
lation of infected aerosolized particles. Like all zoonotic
diseases, the incidence of brucellosis differs between
countries and is the highest in the Middle East and Africa,
where people still adhere to traditional farming and life-
styles. In developed countries, brucellosis has become
a common imported disease because of increased interna-
tional travel or imported food from endemic countries.2
Brucellosis is also notorious of being the most frequently
recognized cause of laboratory-transmitted infection.
Therefore, this organization endangers not only people
with animal contact, but also laboratory personnel per-
forming diagnostic tests.3
Surveillance and control of animal brucellosis in Taiwan
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contaminated farms were then tested monthly. The first
case of bovine brucellosis caused by B abortus was diag-
nosed in 1963. After surveillance for more than one decade,
the infection rate of bovine brucellosis has decreased from
4.99% in 1962 to 0.06% in 1979.4 Bovine brucellosis was
eventually eradicated in Taiwan in 1989. Serologic survey
on sheep has been regularly performed since 1986 and all
showed negative results. First domestic case of human
brucellosis was reported in 1978 in a graduate student who
acquired the infection during laboratory work.4 The first
and the only outbreak occurred in 1979, in which 16 people
including nine laboratory personnel, six dairy farm workers,
and one veterinarian were infected.4 Since then, no human
case, either domestic or imported, has ever been reported
in Taiwan.
Animal brucellosis is a World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) listed disease, and it is also listed as a notifi-
able infectious animal disease in Taiwan by the Bureau of
Animal and Plant Health and Quarantine. Human brucellosis
was listed as a Category IV notifiable disease by the Taiwan
Centers for Disease Control (TCDC) in 2012. Brucellosis can
be confirmed by either positive culture or serologic test.
Two serological tests, rose-Bengal test and micro-
agglutination test (MAT), are in use now in TCDC. Rose-
Bengal test, a kind of agglutination slide test for the
detection of Brucella specific agglutinins, was used as
a first screening test. In endemic areas, use of this test may
be limited due to high background seropositivity.5 In non-
endemic areas like Taiwan, a single positive test with
compatible clinical symptoms and relevant exposure history
is highly suggestive of true infection. Therefore, we use the& Formosan Medical Association. All rights reserved.
354 T.-P. Tsou, J.-J. Mucombination of positive rose-Bengal test and a single MAT
titer of 160 as the definition of a confirmed brucellosis
infection. Identification of suspected isolate of the Brucella
species should be performed in a P3 lab and follow the
safety guidelines for biosafety level 3 laboratory formu-
lated by TCDC.6 Differentiation between species will be
made by polymerase chain reaction using specific primers.
During the early stages of the disease, patients are
frequently bacteremic so circulating brucella are easily
detected by blood culture.3 Therefore, all clinical labs may
encounter a positive isolate of the Brucella species and
need to be aware of its high transmissibility through labo-
ratory procedures. Three of the four cases this year had
their blood culture performed in hospital and reported to
be positive for the Brucella species resulting in dozens of
exposed laboratory personnel. The attack rate of labora-
tory acquired brucellosis ranged from 30%e100% in
different reports, and the risk of transmission is not limited
to staff who process the isolate.3 The Health Protection
Agency in the United Kingdom and Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention in the United States have proposed
guidelines for managing staff with possible exposure to
Brucella species.7, 8 With different categorizations of
exposure, the two guidelines both emphasize the impor-
tance of serological follow up and postexposure prophy-
laxis. Following diagnosing four cases this year, TCDC has
proposed their own recommendations recently.9 Post-
exposure prophylaxis and serological follow-up will be
offered to exposed laboratory staff by TCDC.
All the four cases had travel history to countries with
brucellosis and relevant animal or food history, including
contact with camels and ingestion of possibly unpasteur-
ized milk products. Since eating is an important experience
in any trip, travelers are more willing to try new food,
drinks, and exotic food preparations. The tendency to get
“natural,” “organic” food directly from the farm also
increases the risk of many foodborne pathogens, including
brucellosis.10 According to the World Tourism Organization,
the Middle East has showed the strongest growth of inter-
national tourist arrivals in 2000e2010 (a 9.6% increase),
followed by the Africa (a 6.4% increase), both of which are
regions of leading brucellosis incidence. Besides reaching
a double-digit growth in 2010 (a 14.1% increase from
2009e2010), international tourist arrivals in the Middle Eastare forecast to grow at more than 5% per year in
2011e2020. For the aforementioned reasons, the risk of
imported brucellosis is expected to exist, if not increasing,
in the following years. Travelers, travel medicine doctors,
travel agencies, and tour guides should all be familiar with
food safety principles and proper protective measures
when animal contact is unavoidable.
Infectious diseases know no boundaries. As the epide-
miology of zoonosis changes with changing lifestyle and
evolving human-animal interaction, we should be alert and
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